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The Social Security reform plan proposed by
Reps. Bill Archer (R-Tex.) and Clay Shaw (R-Fla.),
chairmen, respectively, of the House Ways and
Means Committee and its Subcommittee on
Social Security, is a compromise between a
Clinton administration plan to let the govern-
ment invest workers’ payroll taxes in the market
and congressional proposals to let individuals
invest their payroll taxes in personal market-
based accounts. Government investment has
been criticized for the possibility of political
influence on investment decisions, while per-
sonal accounts face attack for making individu-
als shoulder the burden of market risk. The
Archer-Shaw plan is an attempt to satisfy critics
of both approaches.
The Archer-Shaw plan would let individuals
make investment decisions, thereby reducing
the likelihood of political influence, but the gov-
ernment would be required to protect workers
against any losses. The plan’s proposal to priva-
tize profit and socialize risk resembles the incen-
tive structure that led to the 1980s savings and
loan crisis, which cost taxpayers hundreds of bil-
lions of dollars. That incentive structure creates
what economists call “moral hazard” and could
again lead to large taxpayer liabilities if allowed
to take root in the Social Security system.
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Introduction 
In the 1980s the American savings and loan
industry faced a crisis. In response, Congress
passed legislation designed to enable S&Ls to
earn higher profits. But to protect the
American people, Congress shielded cus-
tomers from losses. The result: reckless invest-
ment and hundreds of billions of dollars in
past and future taxpayer liabilities.1 Now
Congress is considering a plan that could
usher in similar risks for Social Security. 
The Social Security reform plan proposed
by Reps. Bill Archer (R-Tex.) and Clay Shaw
(R-Fla.), chairman, respectively, of the House
Ways and Means Committee and its
Subcommittee on Social Security, is a com-
promise between two competing approaches
to reform.2 The Clinton administration has
proposed government-directed investment of
workers’ payroll taxes in the stock market,
while most congressional plans would let
workers invest their own payroll taxes in per-
sonal retirement accounts. Government
investment has been criticized for the possi-
bility of political influence on investment
decisions, and personal accounts face attack
for making individuals shoulder the burden
of market risk. The Archer-Shaw plan is an
attempt to satisfy critics of both approaches.
That plan would let individuals make invest-
ment decisions, thereby reducing the likeli-
hood of political influence, and it would pro-
tect workers against any losses. But the plan’s
proposal to privatize profit and socialize risk
resembles the incentive structure that led to
the S&L crisis of the 1980s, which cost tax-
payers hundreds of billions of dollars. This
incentive structure creates what economists
call “moral hazard” and could again lead to
large taxpayer liabilities if allowed to take
root in the Social Security system.
The Archer-Shaw proposal, like the legis-
lation passed to resuscitate the failing S&L
industry, introduces moral hazard: insur-
ance against risk causes risk taking to
increase. In both cases, the federal govern-
ment—and thereby American taxpayers—
bears the associated costs. 
The Archer-Shaw proposal provokes debate
among both supporters and opponents of
Social Security privatization. This paper focuses
on only one aspect of the Archer-Shaw plan: its
creation of moral hazard.
A Primer on Moral Hazard
Economists use the term “moral hazard”
to denote “the presence of incentives for indi-
viduals to act in ways that incur costs that
they do not have to bear.”3 In practice, that
means that when an individual is insured
against the costs of a given event, that event
becomes more likely to occur. For moral haz-
ard to exist, two criteria must be satisfied: 
• first, the individual must have at least
partial control over whether the insured-
against event takes place; and 
• second, in the absence of insurance, the
costs associated with that event would
cause the individual to take steps to pre-
vent it. 
For instance, an automobile driver has at least
some control over whether he will get into an
accident. The risk of accidents generally caus-
es a driver to take precautions, such as driving
slowly and not venturing out in bad weather.
The two general criteria being satisfied, insur-
ance against that risky event will tend to
increase the likelihood of the event’s taking
place. To illustrate, ask yourself if you would
drive more carefully if you did not have colli-
sion insurance for your car. If the answer is yes,
then moral hazard is at work.
Moral hazard can occur in many different
circumstances. For instance, moral hazard
means that fire insurance can increase fires,
mandatory safety belt laws can increase auto-
mobile accidents, and disability insurance
can lead to more people becoming disabled.4
Moral hazard does not necessarily mean
that people intentionally cause the insured-
against event to occur. It merely means that
people may take fewer precautions against
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that risk. Most insurance policies therefore
contain provisions designed to combat moral
hazard. Deductibles and copayments, for
instance, make the insured person share some
losses; other policies simply limit the types of
activities they will cover. In the absence of such
safeguards, however, moral hazard can gener-
ate considerable losses for insurers.
Origins of the S&L Crisis
The S&L crisis of the 1980s is a striking
example of the damage that moral hazard
can inflict. S&ls (also known as thrifts) are
deposit-taking financial institutions special-
izing in home mortgage loans. The kindly
manager, epitomized by Jimmy Stewart in It’s
a Wonderful Life, held families’ long-term sav-
ings while lending them money to purchase
homes. But beginning in the 1970s, both the
nature and the image of the industry began
to change. S&Ls suffered from interest rate
mismatches between their assets and liabili-
ties. They were paying substantially higher
interest rates to depositors than they were
earning from mortgage loans issued years
earlier. As a result, hundreds of institutions
were in danger of going under.5
There was little that could quickly alter
the underlying economic conditions, so state
and federal legislators faced an unattractive
choice: shut down failing S&Ls, at a substan-
tial cost to taxpayers, or help S&Ls become
more profitable and recover on their own.6
To their later regret, Congress and many state
governments chose the latter course, letting
S&Ls expand out of low-profit mortgage
loans into potentially more profitable—but
riskier—consumer and commercial loans,
leases, and other business activities.7
Congress also lowered capital requirements,
which cushion against losses and put a por-
tion of the owners’ own funds at risk. That
change kept otherwise insolvent S&Ls alive
and gave them additional capital to invest in
newly available business opportunities. The
government also allowed healthy S&Ls to
acquire insolvent institutions without recog-
nizing their losses on their balance sheets.
That created larger S&Ls whose assets con-
sisted partly of “supervisory goodwill” rather
than real financial resources.8
To protect consumers, in 1980 Congress
increased deposit insurance protection from
$40,000 to $100,000.9 As a result, govern-
ment soon bore an increased share of the
increased risks that S&Ls were taking. 
Moral Hazard in the 
S&L Crisis
The expansion of deposit insurance along
with reductions in capital requirements, lib-
eralization of lending policies, and general
laxity of regulatory oversight created what
Richard Herring, professor of finance at the
Wharton School, called “the classic example
of moral hazard.”10 S&L operators and their
customers reaped the gains from new invest-
ments while the government bore the costs
when investments failed.11 Consequently,
neither financial institutions nor their cus-
tomers felt compelled to monitor the risk of
the new business activities. The National
Commission on Financial Institution Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement recounted the
dangers in this situation:
There were huge potential gains avail-
able to S&L managers, unconcerned
with safety and soundness, who were
willing to grow rapidly into lucrative
but risky ventures. With little, if any,
of their own financial resources at
stake, operators had a license to use
insured deposits to engage in risky
ventures. This was not a matter of
having “no choice,” but it was a
rational pursuit of large potential
gains. The downside risk of opera-
tors’ investments had been national-
ized through [deposit insurance]
while the potential upside was in pri-
vate hands. It was perfectly rational to
pursue risk, not only to survive—but
also for the potential of enrichment.1 2
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Bank regulators, who were responsible for
monitoring institutions’ risk taking, often
encouraged S&Ls to take greater risks, since
increased returns were the only way to restore
the industry’s solvency.
For S&L regulators, says Bill Popejoy, a
California S&L executive in the 1980s, “it was
denial. It was ‘God, I hope this savings and
loan mess goes away.’”13 But opportunities
for profit coupled with protection from loss
did not make the problem go away. They
made it worse. By 1988 failing investments
pushed half of all S&Ls into or close to insol-
vency. The S&L cleanup shut down some 750
institutions and cost taxpayers as much as
five times the inflation-adjusted cost of bank
failures during the Great Depression of the
1930s.1 4
Contrary to public perceptions, the S&L
crisis was not primarily about crooked
bankers colluding with corrupt politicians.
The NCFIRRE report insisted that “it is
important to realize that fraud was not the
cause of the S&L debacle” and concluded
that criminal activity accounted for only 10
to 15 percent of total monetary losses.15 Cato
Institute adjunct scholar Bert Ely puts crimi-
nal losses as low as 3 percent.1 6 Instead, the
S&L crisis was the result of well-intentioned
politicians who thought they saw an easy way
out and bankers who accepted their generos-
ity, to the tune of hundreds of billions of tax-
payer dollars. NCFIRRE executive director
James L. Pierce declared: “The risk-takers,
high-flyers and crooks did not just descend
on the industry. They were attracted to it
unwittingly by government policy.”1 7
Social Security Faces Its
Own Insolvency
Like the S&L industry, Social Security is a
venerable American institution in trouble.
Americans still express support for Social
Security’s ideals, but few have confidence in its
future. Just as S&Ls suffered from high inter-
est rates, a changing demographic and eco-
nomic environment means that Social
Security’s pay-as-you-go financing faces multi-
trillion-dollar payroll tax shortfalls. By 2035,
the Social Security Administration predicts,
the program will be capable of paying less than
three-quarters of promised benefits.1 8
Awareness is growing that Social
Security’s future problems cannot be
addressed as past crises were—through bene-
fit cuts, tax hikes, or increases in the retire-
ment age. Those steps would further lower
Social Security’s already low rate of return to
retirees, making it a worse deal than it already
is. In his statement at the White House
Conference on Social Security on April 7,
1998, President Clinton recognized this new
thinking when he identified a low rate of
return as one of Social Security’s fundamen-
tal problems.1 9 At a July 20, 1998, town hall
meeting in Albuquerque, New Mexico,
Clinton suggested that a solution to Social
Security’s financing problems could lie in
“the higher return on investment” in private
capital markets.2 0
In his 1999 State of the Union Address,
President Clinton introduced a plan for a
government-appointed board to invest a por-
tion of current payroll taxes in stocks. The
Clinton plan met with robust opposition.
Federal Reserve Board chairman Alan
Greenspan criticized the proposal for creat-
ing the danger that politically motivated leg-
islators and “rent-seeking” special interests
would collude to channel investment toward
their own ends rather than those of the pub-
lic. “Even with Herculean efforts,” Greenspan
said, “I doubt if it would be feasible to insu-
late . . . the trust funds from political pres-
sures—direct and indirect—to allocate capital
to less than its most productive use.”2 1
Experience with state government pension
funds, which have divested some investments
for political reasons while making others to
benefit local industries, lends credence to
those fears.2 2 In March 1999 the Senate
passed by a vote of 99–0 a resolution oppos-
ing any government-directed investment of
Social Security funds.2 3
In contrast, many reformers propose that
individuals, rather than government, do the
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investing. Personal retirement accounts,
through which individuals invest part or all
of their payroll taxes in stocks, bonds, or
other assets, would increase Social Security’s
rate of return. And since individuals would
control their own assets and invest toward
their own financial goals, personal accounts
would avoid the political risks of government
investment. Nevertheless, personal accounts
have not gone without criticism. 
Opponents of personal accounts contend
that they “expose individuals to a variety of
risks, any one of which can shrink their retire-
ment benefits and a combination of which
can nearly wipe them out.”2 4The true risks of
investments in stocks and bonds have been
overstated by opponents of personal
accounts.2 5 Nevertheless, the perception of
risk has made personal accounts more diffi-
cult to sell politically. 
A second problem is that personal
accounts’ higher returns would not, by them-
selves, eliminate the need for tax increases or
benefit cuts. If the diversion of payroll taxes
to personal accounts reduced benefits on a
proportional basis, the future gap between
Social Security’s payroll tax assets and its
benefit liabilities would remain constant. To
illustrate, imagine a reform plan under which
2 percent of wages were diverted to a person-
al account and future benefits were reduced
proportionately. In the future, tax revenues
and benefit payments would be reduced by
the same amount, so the difference between
them—and the need for tax increases or ben-
efit cuts to close the gap—would not be
changed.2 6
The Archer-Shaw plan attempts to satisfy
objections to both government investing and
personal accounts while capturing the
increased rates of return on market invest-
ment to bolster Social Security’s finances: 
Our plan is designed to be politically
feasible. Realizing that Social
Security reform cannot happen with-
out bipartisan support, we are offer-
ing a plan that builds on areas of
bipartisan consensus and bridges the
gaps between ideological differences.
The plan fully maintains the current
safety net and fully shields individu-
als and their benefits from market
risk. However, it creates individual
accounts so that benefits can be
funded in advance with real savings.2 7
Archer and Shaw’s political compromise has
the potential to create moral hazard, which
led to billions of dollars in losses during the
S&L crisis. 
The Archer-Shaw Proposal
To avert the politicization of capital mar-
kets, Archer declares that, “as a matter of
principle, Uncle Sam should not be making
private investment decisions for you.”2 8
Instead, Archer and Shaw propose that the
government deposit 2 percent of workers’
wages subject to payroll taxes in personal
accounts controlled by the workers.29 The
worker would invest those deposits in one of
more than 50 competing private stock and
bond investment funds,3 0 where they would
build value over time. 
The defining feature of the Archer-Shaw
plan is its “clawback.” When a worker reach-
es retirement, he returns his account balance
to the government. The government uses
those funds to pay the worker the full bene-
fits to which he is entitled under current law.
The higher returns from personal accounts
are clawed back into Social Security, provid-
ing funds so the program can continue to pay
full benefits without increased taxes. 
Archer-Shaw’s clawback accomplishes two
goals. First, it integrates personal accounts
into Social Security’s guaranteed defined-
benefit structure. The worker receives his full
Social Security benefit even if his account’s
investments perform poorly, thereby shifting
market risk from individuals to the govern-
ment. If an account loses money, the govern-
ment rather than the worker absorbs the loss.
Maintaining Social Security’s traditional
benefit guarantee might placate those who
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oppose personal accounts because of market
risk, however slight that risk might be in
practice. 
Second, by capturing the higher returns
from personal retirement accounts, Archer-
Shaw’s clawback minimizes the need for tax
increases or benefit cuts. Unlike a proposal
that reduces future benefit payments by the
amount going into the account, Archer-
Shaw’s clawback reduces traditional benefit
payments by the amount that comes out of
the account after it has been invested in high-
er-yielding stocks and bonds. The larger the
account balance, the smaller the amount that
Social Security must pay out of its own
funds. The clawback enables Archer and
Shaw to boast of “saving and strengthening
Social Security without raising taxes or cut-
ting benefits.”31
However, there is one important excep-
tion to the clawback. If a worker’s personal
account balance grows large enough to pay
benefits higher than those promised by
Social Security, the worker may be able to
convert his account to an annuity3 2 rather
than receive his standard benefits from
Social Security.33 This provision could attract
support from those who favor personal
accounts because of the potential for
increased retirement incomes, since workers
could see gains from personal accounts with-
out being subject to the losses. This provi-
sion, we will see, is a central weakness of the
Archer-Shaw proposal.
Moral Hazard in
Archer-Shaw
If the market falls, workers are protected,
but if the market does very well, workers
receive extra benefits. All this sounds almost
too good to be true. It is. Enter moral hazard.
To find moral hazard in Archer-Shaw, we
need merely look at how rational individuals
would treat the investments in their personal
accounts.
People invest to make money. Indeed,
the efficiency of private markets is
premised on the idea that self-interest dri-
ves individuals to allocate capital in the
most profitable, and hence the most pro-
ductive, manner. Consequently, we must
assume that workers will seek to do as well
for themselves as possible.
In practice, workers would search out
investments with rates of return high
enough to provide extra benefits at retire-
ment. Let us call this rate the “bonus
return”: if the return on a worker’s account
averaged at least this rate, the worker would
receive additional benefits. 
Reflecting his opposition to government
investment, Archer says that, “if there is to be
investment in the markets, it must be under
the control of individuals, free to make up
their own minds.”34 To that end, Archer-
Shaw allows workers to choose among at
least 50 competing investment options. But
how would investment providers attract cus-
tomers? Administrative fees for Archer-
Shaw’s accounts are capped at 0.25 percent of
assets, so investment companies could not
afford to offer extensive services even if work-
ers desired them. 
In truth, there is one and only one area in
which the investment companies would com-
pete: the bonus return that brings extra ben-
efits. Nothing else matters, because nothing
else affects the benefits a worker will receive
at retirement. Just as depositors were drawn
to S&Ls offering higher interest rates on
deposits, workers will be drawn to invest-
ment companies promising to achieve the
bonus return. To attract business, investment
companies will offer investments that have
the best chance, however small, of reaching
that level. 
But what would the bonus return be? And
would attempts to reach it cause losses?
There is no definitive answer to those ques-
tions. Older workers, with less time to build
an account balance, would have to earn a
higher rate of return. Men would need to
earn a somewhat lower rate of return than
women would, because they have shorter life
expectancies and can purchase annuities at a
lower price. 
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Let us use one example to get a rough idea.
The Social Security Administration recently
released a new benefit statement estimating
the retirement benefits an individual would
be entitled to receive. SSA uses the example of
“Wanda Worker,” a female born in 1960 who
earns $30,364 annually. Assuming her
income continues unchanged, at age 67 she
would be entitled to $1,096 per month.35 So,
for Wanda to receive extra benefits under
Archer-Shaw, her personal account would
need to provide the money needed to pur-
chase an annuity that paid at least $1,096 per
month. 
In 1995 the average monthly benefit from
a joint-and-survivor annuity, which provides
spousal protections roughly equivalent to
those of Social Security, was $6.48 per $1,000
of premium costs.3 6That is to say, a $100,000
lump sum payment at age 65 could purchase
an annuity paying $648 per month for life.37
An annuity paying Wanda’s estimated retire-
ment benefit of $1,096 per month would cost
$169,136. To receive extra benefits, therefore,
Wanda would need to retire with an account
balance in excess of $169,136. Assuming
Archer-Shaw took effect in 2000, she would
have 27 years in which to amass that sum. To
save $169,136 with an account funded with 2
percent of Wanda’s wages would require a
real annual return of 13.7 percent.
Despite extraordinary market perfor-
mance in recent years, it is unlikely that
Wanda could achieve this bonus return
through ordinary stock index funds or bal-
anced mutual funds. Stock returns have aver-
aged 7 percent since 1802 and 7.5 percent
since 1946.3 8The highest average return over
20 years for the stock market as a whole has
been only 12.6 percent; over 30 years, it drops
to 10.6 percent.3 9 Past market performance
indicates that the bonus return for most
workers under the Archer-Shaw plan is so
high that the Heritage Foundation’s Daniel J.
Mitchell predicts that “the number of work-
ers with excess funds will be zero.”4 0
But that’s not the end of the story. In fact,
it’s only the beginning. The fact that most
workers won’t achieve the bonus return does
not mean that they won’t try. And why
shouldn’t they? Archer and Shaw boast that
the plan’s benefit guarantee “enables us to
shield individuals and their benefits from
market risk . . . all risk is borne by the government,
not the individual.”4 1Like bank customers dur-
ing the S&L crisis, workers under Archer-
Shaw would have everything to gain and
nothing to lose. 
Under Archer-Shaw rational workers
would invest with the sole aim of earning very
high rates of return, however unlikely that
might be. A financial adviser, if acting on his
fiduciary oath to “act in good faith and in the
best interests of the client,”42 would recom-
mend that course. Because of Archer-Shaw’s
perverse incentives, resources “under the con-
trol of individuals, free to make up their own
minds” would flow toward volatile invest-
ments such as Internet and technology
stocks, emerging markets, and the like rather
than toward broad-based mutual funds.
Volatile investments would likely produce
either higher gains or higher losses than
would balanced funds. As with S&Ls during
the 1980s, the gains would flow to investors
while Uncle Sam—and consequently
American taxpayers—would pick up the tab
for any losses.
It is hard to say with precision how big
those losses could be. The Archer-Shaw plan
assumes that personal accounts will return a
real average of 5.6 percent annually (not
including management fees, capped at 0.25
percent). If that rate of return were main-
tained, Social Security’s long-term deficit
would be eliminated and payroll tax rates
could gradually be reduced beginning in
2040. Archer-Shaw’s “break-even” return (at
which Social Security’s long-term deficit is
eliminated but payroll tax rates cannot be
reduced over the long term) is one percentage
point lower, at 4.6 percent annually.43 If even
20 percent of Archer-Shaw’s personal
accounts reaped 0 percent returns (meaning
that they neither gained nor lost value),
Archer-Shaw would fail to meet its basic
financial goals.4 4 Should the number of
underperforming accounts increase and the
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size of losses grow larger, taxpayers could face
financing problems far greater than those
currently posed by Social Security.
To hope that risky investment and account
losses would not arise because workers under
the Archer-Shaw plan would not act in their
own best interests is akin to S&L regulators in
the 1980s hoping the problem would “just go
away.” The NCFIRRE’s Pierce said of the S&L
crisis, “There was a perverse incentive to gam-
ble—heads you win, and tails, the taxpayer will
pay the loss.”45Archer-Shaw’s incentive struc-
ture is no different. 
A Return to Government
Investing
The Archer-Shaw plan appears to implicit-
ly recognize its moral hazard problem and
attempts to address it. But in doing so,
Archer-Shaw retreats toward the govern-
ment-directed investing of the Clinton
administration’s proposal and threatens to
recreate the very “political risk” it was
designed to avoid.
Archer-Shaw contains three requirements
designed to manage investment risk. First,
the personal accounts in Archer-Shaw must
be invested 60 percent in stocks and 40 per-
cent in corporate bonds. But a mixed portfo-
lio would by itself do little to control risk tak-
ing. What would prevent a fund made up of
60 percent Internet stocks and 40 percent
junk bonds?46 In fact, a mixed-portfolio
requirement could even aggravate risk, since
workers seeking to achieve the bonus return
would compensate for lower bond yields by
choosing higher-yielding—and therefore
riskier—stocks. 
Second, workers are required to invest in
index funds, which have a reputation for safe-
ty and stability.4 7The assumption that index
funds are inherently low risk reveals a misun-
derstanding of indexing, which simply
means buying all of the stocks or bonds in
the chosen class rather than actively predict-
ing winners and losers. The stability of an
index fund is wholly dependent on its under-
lying assets, such as the S&P 500 index that
underlay the original Vanguard index fund.
Today there are index funds for a dizzying
array of investment indices: from precious
metals, to the gas industry, to a Malaysian
index (three-year return: negative 40 percent),
to the “death-care” industry of funeral homes
and burials, to a fund investing only in stock
car racing. 
More to the point, some index funds are
explicitly geared toward increased volatility
and risk, which is precisely what a rational
investor under Archer-Shaw would seek. For
instance, the Potomac Dow 30 Plus Fund
and the Potomac Internet Plus Fund track
the Dow Jones industrial average and the
Dow Jones composite internet index, respec-
tively. By entering into futures contracts and
options, those funds seek “to produce daily
results that correspond to 125% of the per-
formance, either positive or negative,” of the
respective index.4 8 This type of enhanced
volatility index, or one producing even high-
er risk, is the sort of fund one would expect to
see under Archer-Shaw.
Third, workers are restricted to only “pre-
approved, low-risk, investment options.”4 9 But
since workers under Archer-Shaw would have
every incentive to seek out high-risk invest-
ment products, and investment companies
would have every incentive to provide them,
ordinary regulatory guidelines like those
applied to individual retirement accounts
(IRAs) and employer-provided 401(k) plans
would be insufficient to curtail risk taking.
For instance, under so-called self-directed
IRAs, individuals can invest in individual
stocks as well as assets such as precious met-
als, real estate, limited partnerships, and viat-
ic settlements (the purchase of the life insur-
ance policy of a terminally ill patient). In fact,
there is little to prevent an individual from
“day trading” with his IRA account.
Even the more restrictive rules on 401(k)
offerings would not limit risk taking if
applied to the Archer-Shaw plan.5 0 In prac-
tice, employers restrict the aggressiveness of
the investment options they offer through
401(k) plans because of the employer’s fidu-
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ciary responsibility to employees participat-
ing in the plan, which can result in the
employer’s sharing in an employee’s invest-
ment losses if the investment options provid-
ed are not “prudent.”5 1 In other words, mar-
ket discipline—imposed on both the employ-
ee-investor and the employer—dictates the
risk of the investment options offered and
accepted, not specific regulations of the law
itself.
For those reasons, Archer-Shaw’s invest-
ment approval process, overseen by a new
Social Security Guarantee Board, would have
to go far beyond the basic regulations and
consumer disclosure associated with IRA and
401(k) investment programs. It could easily
extend to the point of regulating the returns
on individual accounts.5 2
Archer-Shaw’s approval process therefore
presents a threat similar to the one posed by
President Clinton’s plan for direct govern-
ment investment controlled by a board of
impartial investment advisers. Greenspan’s
objection to government-directed investment
is that it inevitably invites political pressure
that distorts capital markets and risks tax-
payer losses. Archer and Shaw explicitly reject
government investment of Social Security
funds, yet Archer-Shaw’s investment
approval process could allow effective gov-
ernment control over ostensibly private
investment decisions.5 3
It is worth noting that, even if Archer-
Shaw’s approval process could effectively
curb risky investment while avoiding politi-
cal influence, it would be self-defeating.
“Safe” investment would practically elimi-
nate the possibility of workers receiving extra
benefits, which Archer and Shaw have pro-
moted as an advantage of their plan. Workers
without the chance to profit by their invest-
ments lack any incentive to monitor the per-
formance of those investments. Hence,
returns on such investments would likely be
below market averages, possibly leading to a
future revenue shortfall. (Recall that account
returns of one percentage point or more
below market averages would render Archer-
Shaw non-self-financing.)5 4Moreover, persis-
tent market underperformance is indicative
of the misallocation of capital, which would
reduce the ancillary economic benefits of pri-
vate investment that Archer and Shaw have
touted.55
Archer-Shaw presents a choice between two
evils: moral hazard on one hand and de facto
government investment on the other. If, under
Archer-Shaw, individuals cannot be allowed to
choose their own investments, then govern-
ment-controlled investment—and the corrup-
tion, government influence on capital mar-
kets, and taxpayer losses that potentially
accompany it—is the only alternative. 
What Separates Archer-Shaw’s
Moral Hazard from That of 
Other Plans?
In defense of Archer-Shaw, it could be said
that any Social Security plan incorporating
personal accounts in conjunction with a
guaranteed minimum benefit creates an ele-
ment of moral hazard. For instance, Joseph J.
Cordes and C. Eugene Steuerle of the Urban
Institute warn:
Privatization proposals that would
allow individuals to “keep” gains
from private accounts in good times
but require the government to main-
tain a floor in bad times would
encourage individuals to take exces-
sive risk. The consequences to the
government would be similar to
those when the savings and loan
financial sector essentially went
bankrupt.5 6
But there are two possible modifications
to Archer-Shaw that would allow personal
accounts to be combined with a guaranteed
minimum benefit without creating moral
hazard.
The first change is to replace Archer-
Shaw’s combination of a 100 percent claw-
back and bonus benefits with a clawback of
less than 100 percent, which would pay extra
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benefits to all workers regardless of the
returns on their personal accounts. The sec-
ond is to retain Archer-Shaw’s basic benefit
structure but increase the size of the person-
al account so that the bonus return need not
be so high. Neither would fix the more gener-
al flaws in the Archer-Shaw approach, but
both would ameliorate Archer-Shaw’s moral
hazard problem.5 7
The first modification is found in a plan
proposed by Harvard economist Martin
Feldstein.5 8 His plan, which introduced the
clawback approach, is the base on which
Archer-Shaw is constructed. Like Archer-Shaw,
the Feldstein plan contains personal accounts
(2.3 percent of wages) with a guarantee that no
one will receive less than promised under cur-
rent law. But instead of clawing back 100 per-
cent of the personal account (coupled with
additional benefits for those reaching the
bonus return), the Feldstein plan has a 75 per-
cent clawback. Seventy-five percent of the per-
sonal account would help fund promised
Social Security benefits, while the other 25 per-
cent would be additional retirement income.
For instance, an individual entitled to $1,300
per month from Social Security and holding
an account capable of paying $800 per month
would receive a total monthly retirement
income of $1,500. Three-quarters of his
account would help fund his promised benefit,
while an extra $200 would derive from the 25
percent remaining.
That would combat moral hazard by giv-
ing workers a personal stake in the success or
failure of their accounts. In contrast to
Archer-Shaw, a worker under the Feldstein
plan would not have to earn astronomical
rates of return to reap higher benefits upon
retirement. Twenty-five percent of the per-
sonal account is his to keep, regardless of the
total size of his account. Likewise, unlike
Archer-Shaw, under which investment losses
would not affect a worker’s retirement
income, the Feldstein plan makes the worker
share in losses as well as gains. If the account
performed poorly or lost money, the worker
would receive less extra income at retirement.
For those reasons, workers would be likely to
manage their accounts no differently than
they would ordinary investments, with an eye
to maximizing returns and minimizing risks.
For instance, a worker making a constant
$29,000 a year throughout his life and receiv-
ing the stock market average of 7 percent
annually for 45 years would add $341 to his
monthly retirement income (at average annu-
ity prices) under the Feldstein plan. If that
individual’s account returned only 2 percent,
his extra retirement income would amount
to only $78 per month. Just as capital
requirements for financial institutions cause
operators to put their own money at risk,
thereby sharing in the gains or losses of their
institution’s investments, so a limited claw-
back such as the one in Feldstein’s plan
would ensure that workers’ investment deci-
sions directly affected their retirement
incomes.
That is not to say that the Feldstein plan
has no potential for moral hazard. Clearly, a
100 percent clawback like Archer-Shaw’s pro-
duces moral hazard. Just as clearly, a 0 per-
cent clawback, in which the individual reaps
all gains and suffers all losses, would not pro-
duce moral hazard. When the clawback lies
between 0 and 100 percent, the level of moral
hazard will differ from person to person.
Some observers have suggested that the claw-
back must fall below Feldstein’s 75 percent
before moral hazard is quashed.5 9Yet it seems
clear that workers with a true stake in the per-
formance of their accounts—one that can
make a difference in retirement income of
hundreds of dollars per month—will make
more thoughtful investment decisions than
they would if no such stake existed.
An important additional consideration
is the size of the personal accounts. Since
Archer-Shaw’s personal accounts contain
only 2 percent of wages, out of total payroll
taxes of 12.4 percent, accounts must receive
a very high rate of return in order to pro-
duce higher benefits than those promised
by Social Security. If the percentage of
wages deposited in the accounts grew, how-
ever, the bonus return needed to receive
extra benefits would fall. 
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Let us return to Wanda Worker, the 40-
year-old who would need to earn 13.7 percent
on her 2 percent personal account in order to
receive extra benefits. If, however, the account
were funded with 5 percent of wages, the
bonus return would be 8.9 percent, still high
by historical standards. With personal
accounts funded with 10.6 percent of wages
(the amount allotted to the Old Age and
Survivors portion of Social Security), the
bonus return would be only 4.5 percent
annually. If Wanda could save 10.6 percent of
her wages for a full 45 years, the bonus return
would fall to 0.7 percent.6 0 With larger per-
sonal accounts, the prospect of receiving
increased benefits is much higher. Workers
have a greater stake in the responsible man-
agement of their accounts and reduced
incentives to take large investment risks. 
The disadvantage of both of those
approaches from a political point of view is
that they require more money up-front.
The 75 percent clawback under the
Feldstein plan deprives Social Security of 25
percent of the account’s balance, leaving
Social Security short by 0.6 percent of
wages.6 1Likewise, a personal account fund-
ed with 10.6 percent of wages would create
an immediate funding deficit. That “lost”
money would have to be made up through
tax increases, benefit cuts, or reductions in
other government spending, steps that
Archer and Shaw take pride in not requir-
ing. Archer proudly touts the “corner-
stones” of their plan: “It does NOT cut ben-
efits, it does NOT raise taxes, but it DOES
SAVE SOCIAL SECURITY.”6 2
Moreover, neither the Feldstein plan nor a
modified Archer-Shaw with larger personal
accounts is perfect, even if they avoid Archer-
Shaw’s moral hazard problem. Like Archer-
Shaw, they give workers no property right in
their personal accounts and tap large
amounts of general revenue. But the presence
of moral hazard in Archer-Shaw transforms
an approach that is less than perfect to one
that is unacceptably risky.
An investor who suffers losses along with
gains will rationally seek the maximum
expected return on his investments, that is,
the combination of risk and return that will
reap the largest long-term gains. When an
investor does not suffer losses and must reap
large gains to see any personal benefit, as
under Archer-Shaw, he will seek out the max-
imum potential return on his investments
regardless of risk. To avoid moral hazard, a
Social Security reform plan incorporating
personal retirement accounts must give
workers a stake in both the gains and the
losses of the accounts under their control.
Archer-Shaw fails to do so.
Conclusion
The Archer-Shaw Social Security proposal
attempts to safeguard a program facing
structural problems as serious as those that
confronted the S&L industry in the early
1980s. Social Security, as did the S&Ls, faces
insolvency as a result of a changing econom-
ic environment. But Archer-Shaw seems not
to reflect the lessons of the disastrous S&L
resuscitation plans. Archer-Shaw is caught
between the Scylla of government-directed
investment, which risks political interference
and financial losses, and the Charybdis of
market risk, which many people deem too
dangerous for workers to manage. Archer-
Shaw collides with moral hazard, the incen-
tive structure at the root of the mammoth
financial losses suffered in the U.S. S&L crisis
of the 1980s and early 1990s.
As Arthur J. Rolnick notes, an important
lesson of the S&L episode is: “Despite a host
of regulatory agencies and well-intentioned
bank regulators, the regulatory system failed
to contain the moral hazard induced by 100
percent deposit insurance. . . . While ways
may be found to improve the regulatory sys-
tem, they are all likely to fail without the aid
of market discipline.”6 3Archer-Shaw protects
personal accounts from losses but allows
gains only through highly risky investments.
That lack of true market discipline creates a
moral hazard problem every bit as acute as
that of the S&L industry. 
11
The presence of
moral hazard in
Archer-Shaw
transforms an
approach that is
less than perfect
to one that is
unacceptably
risky.
Notes
1.  The U.S. General Accounting Office estimated
that the direct and indirect costs of the S&L crisis
totaled $160.1 billion, $132.1 billion of which was
paid by taxpayers. Those cost estimates exclude
interest costs associated with financing the
bailout. Interest costs of Financing Corporation
and Resolution Funding Corporation bonds are
estimated at $111.8 billion, $76.2 billion of which
was paid by taxpayers. In addition, the GAO cal-
culated the interest costs derived from direct
appropriations at $209 billion (since those appro-
priations required additional deficit spending).
Of that amount, $176 billion remains to be paid.
In sum, the GAO estimates that the total cost—
past and future—of the S&L crisis to the public
and the private sector exceeds $480 billion. See
U.S. General Accounting Office, Financial Audit:
Resolution Trust Corporation’s 1995 and 1994
Financial Statements (Washington: Government
Printing Office, July 1996), pp. 13, 19.
2.  At this writing, the Archer-Shaw proposal has
not been entered as legislative language. Analysis
herein relies on material produced by Reps.
Archer and Shaw and the House Ways and Means
Committee. 
3.  Graham Bannock, R. E. Baxter, and Evan Davis,
The Penguin Dictionary of Economics, 5th ed. (London:
Penguin Books, 1992), p. 295.
4.  An early application of moral hazard principles
to broader public policy was Sam Peltzman, “The
Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation,” Journal
of Political Economy, August 1975, pp. 677–725.
5.  See Joe Stilwell, “The Savings and Loan Industry:
Averting Collapse,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis
no. 7, February 15, 1982.
6.  The United States has a “dual banking system.”
Financial institutions such as S&Ls can be char-
tered and regulated either by the federal govern-
ment or by the state in which they are based.
7.  The major federal legislation was the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act of 1980 and the Garn–St. Germain Depository
Institutions Act of 1982. Comparable state legisla-
tion gave similar powers to many state-regulated
thrifts.
8.  The 1989 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery
and Enforcement Act discontinued this regulatory
goodwill, forcing the S&Ls to quickly recognize their
losses by either reducing their asset holdings by sell-
ing loans or raising capital from investors. Some
weaker institutions were forced into insolvency. In
1996 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in United States v.
Winstar Corp.that the government had breached con-
tracts with the thrifts. More than 100 are currently
pursuing claims, at an estimated cost to taxpayers of
from $10 billion to $20 billion. 
9.  In practice, even the $100,000 limit could be
evaded through the practice of “brokering
deposits,” in which an individual with large sums
of money would contract with a third party to
open accounts in multiple institutions. Many
S&Ls were flooded with brokered deposits, which
led to declines in the quality of the S&Ls’ loans.
Deposit brokering was limited through provi-
sions of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991.
10. Quoted in “Beware of Moral Hazard,”
Editorial, Thomson’s International Banking Regulator,
February 27, 1995, p. 4.
11. One effect of lower capital requirements was
that even relatively small investment failures could
push an institution into insolvency, thereby trans-
ferring losses to the deposit insurance system.
12. National Commission on Financial Institution
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement, Origins and
Causes of the S&L Debacle: A Blueprint for Reform
(Washington: Government Printing Office, July
1993), p. 46.
13. Quoted in Jonathan Lanser, “What We
Learned from Keating,” Orange County Register,
April 11, 1999, p. K1.
14. See Arthur J. Rolnick, “Market Discipline as a
Regulator of Bank Risk,” Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston Conference Series no. 37, November 1993.
The cost of bank closures from 1930 to 1935
totaled $6.7 billion ($81.4 billion in 2000 dollars),
according to the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation. Estimates of the total cost of the
S&L crisis run as high as five times that amount.
15. National Commission on Financial Institution
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement, p. 71.
16. Bert Ely, “How Washington Spawned the S&L
Crisis,” Editorial, San Diego Union-Tribune,
September 9, 1990, p. C4. 
17. Quoted in Marianne Lavell, “Commission
Says: Abolish Thrifts,” National Law Journal,
August 16, 1993, p. 3.
18. See 1999 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of
the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and
Disability Trust Funds (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1999), Table III.A2, “Comparison
of Estimated Income Rates and Cost Rates for
12
OASDI and HI, Calendar Years 1999–2075,
Intermediate Assumptions.”
19. William Jefferson Clinton, “Remarks at White
House Conference on Social Security, April 7,
1998,” www.whitehouse.gov/wh/work/040798.
20. William Jefferson Clinton, “Remarks at
Albuquerque, New Mexico, July 20, 1998,” quoted
in Michael Tanner, “The Perils of Government
Investing,” Cato Briefing Paper no. 43, December
1, 1999, p. 1.
21. Alan Greenspan, Testimony before the Senate
Committee on the Budget, 106th Cong., 1st sess.,
January 28, 1999.
22. On the dangers of government investment of
payroll taxes, see Tanner; and Krzysztof M.
Ostaszewski, “Privatizing the Social Security
Trust Fund? Don’t Let the Government Invest,”
Cato Institute Social Security Paper no. 6, January
14, 1997.
23. Senate Amendment 145 to Senate Conference
Resolution 20, sponsored by Sen. John Ashcroft
(R-Mo.), passed March 24, 1999.
24. Hans Reimer, “Four Arguments against Social
Security Privatization,” 2030 Center, May 17, 1998,
www.ourfuture.org/features/sss/experts. asp.
25. See Melissa Hieger and William Shipman,
“Common Objections to a Market-Based Social
Security System: A Response,” Cato Institute
Social Security Paper no. 10, July 22, 1997. See
also Jeremy Siegel, Stocks for the Long Run, 2d ed.
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), chap. 1.
26. For instance, in 2035 Social Security is pro-
jected to take in 13.2 percent of wages while
promising benefits equal to 18.2 percent of wages,
a shortfall of 5 percent of wages. Under this hypo-
thetical reform plan, tax revenues in 2035 would
be reduced to 11.2 percent of wages while benefits
would fall to 16.2 percent, but the funding short-
fall of 5 percent of wages would remain
unchanged. Taxes would still have to be raised or
benefits cut. 
27. Bill Archer and Clay Shaw, Testimony before
the House Budget Committee Task Force on Social
Security, 106th Cong., 1st sess., June 29, 1999.
28. Bill Archer, “Statement on Introduction of Social
Security Guarantee Plan, April 28, 1999,”
www.house.gov/archer/issues/socialsecurity/index/
html.
29. Instead of being deducted from workers’ pay-
roll taxes (a “carve-out”), those deposits would be
funded out of projected budget surpluses (an
“add-on”). See Darcy Ann Olsen, “Social Security
Reform Proposals: USAs, Clawbacks, and Other
Add-Ons,” Cato Briefing Paper no. 47, June 11,
1999.
30. Archer and Shaw use the phrase “investment
options,” which I have taken to mean discrete
funds rather than fund companies offering a vari-
ety of investment products. The number of
options, be they funds or fund companies, is less
important than how they would be approved or
regulated.  
31. Bill Archer and Clay Shaw, “Outline of the
Social Security Guarantee Plan,” April 28, 1999,
www.house.gov/archer/issues/socialsecurity//ind
ex/html.
32. An annuity is an insurance contract between
an individual (the annuitant) and an insurance
company guaranteeing regular periodic payments
for a specified period of time in exchange for a
prior payment to the insurance company. In other
words, an annuity is a way to convert a lump sum
of money (the premium) into a defined regular
benefit continuing for an agreed-upon period of
time, often the lifetime of the purchaser.
33. Archer, “Statement on Introduction of Social
Security Guarantee Plan”; and Archer and Shaw,
Testimony of June 29, 1999.
34. Bill Archer, “President’s Social Security ‘Plan’
Still Won’t Save Social Security Program,” Press
release, October 21, 1999.
35. The new benefit statement is available at
www.ssa.gov.
36. If purchased at age 65. Annuity prices from
Olivia Mitchell, James M. Poterba, and Mark J.
Warshawsky, “New Evidence on the Money’s
Worth of Individual Annuities,” National Bureau
of Economic Research Working Paper no. 6002,
April 1997, Table 1, p. 34.
37. Bear in mind that Social Security benefits are
indexed for inflation, while the typical annuity is
not. Inflation-adjusted annuities have only
recently entered the market. To ensure a monthly
income equivalent to Social Security later in life, a
worker would have to purchase a larger nonin-
dexed annuity. That would increase the bonus
return needed.
38. Siegel, pp. 13, 15.
39. Ibid., p. 27. Even if Wanda Worker were
younger, with more time to save, the needed
bonus return would remain high. If Wanda were
13
25, with 42 years to add to her account, she would
need a real annual return averaging 9 percent to
receive extra benefits. Even this return is very
unlikely on standard stock index funds.
Assuming an average market return of 7 percent,
a standard deviation of returns of 2 percentage
points (the deviation for 30-year holdings), and a
normal distribution of returns, only one account
in six would bring extra benefits. The standard
deviation of returns over 42 years would be small-
er than over 30 years, so the percentage of workers
achieving the bonus return would be even lower.
40. Daniel J. Mitchell, “GOP Offers a Social
Security Plan Worse Than Clinton’s,” Wall Street
Journal, May 3, 1999, p. A22.
41. Archer and Shaw, Testimony of June 29, 1999.
Emphasis added.
42. Oath of the National Association of Personal
Financial Advisers, www.napfa.org. 
43. Memorandum from Stephen C. Goss, deputy
chief actuary, Social Security Administration, to
Henry C. Ballantyne, chief actuary, Social Security
Administration, April 29, 1999, www.house.gov/
archer/issues/socialsecurity/index/html.
44. Assuming the remaining 80 percent of accounts
returned an average of 5.6 percent annually. 
45. Quoted in Lavell, p. 3.
46. Even under normal circumstances, a mixed
portfolio could fail to control risk. Since bonds
are more volatile than stocks over the long run,
adding a bond index fund to the portfolio would
tend to increase risk unless the bond portfolio
was intentionally designed with a negative covari-
ance of returns to the stock portfolio (meaning
that when the stocks performed above average the
bonds would perform below average, and vice
versa). See Siegel, pp. 26–29. 
47. Archer, “Draft summary of the Social Security
Guarantee Act of 2000,” attachment to “President
Throws in the Towel on Saving Social Security,”
Press release, January 26, 2000.
48. “The Potomac Funds Announce Launch of
the Potomac Dow 30 Plus Fund and the Potomac
Internet Plus Fund,” Company press release,
White Plains, N.Y., December 1, 1999.
49. Archer, “Statement on Introduction of Social
Security Guarantee Plan.” Emphasis added.
50. On fiduciary responsibility, see Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1104
(1974).
51. ERISA, § 1104(a)(1)(B). Even under a strict
interpretation of prudence, risky investments
might be permissible: the law’s requirement is to
diversify “the investments of the plan so as to minimize
the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is
clearly prudent not to do so.” ERISA, § 1104(a)(1)(C).
Emphasis added. Under Archer-Shaw, clearly it
would not be prudent to diversify so as to mini-
mize the risk of large losses since doing so would
minimize the prospect for large gains.
52. That would not be unprecedented. In the priva-
tized Chilean system, minimum and maximum
annual returns relative to market averages are dic-
tated by the government; that has had the effect of
forcing fund providers to create essentially identi-
cal investment products. This could lead to capital
misallocation, since funds would not necessarily
flow where returns were highest. In addition, it
concentrates the interests of workers, as well as the
voting power of shareholders, in a relatively few
industries. See L. Jacobo Rodríguez, “Chile’s Private
Pension System at 18: Its Current State and Future
Challenges,” Cato Institute Social Security Paper
no. 17, July 30, 1999, pp. 5, 8–9. 
53. Archer-Shaw’s Social Security Guarantee Board
would consist of six individuals appointed by the
Social Security Board of Trustees, who are them-
selves appointed by the president. (Four of the
Social Security trustees are appointed automatical-
ly: the secretaries of the Treasury, Labor, and
Health and Human Services and the commission-
er of Social Security. Two outside trustees are
appointed by the president and confirmed by the
Senate.) Could members of the new board alter the
definition of “low-risk” to encompass nonmarket
risks such as those posed by the environment, local
economic conditions, labor relations, and social
justice? For instance, former labor secretary Robert
Reich, a noted enthusiast for “industrial policy”
under which the government favors industries it
believes to be important to future economic
growth, was a member of the Social Security Board
of Trustees during his tenure in the Clinton cabi-
net. Would his appointment to an Archer-Shaw
guarantee board be entirely divorced from his eco-
nomic views? Likewise, in his environmental mani-
festo, Earth in the Balance, Vice President Gore says
that protecting the environment should be the
“central organizing principle of our civilization.”
To Gore, this “means embarking on an all-out
effort to use every policy and program, every law
and institution, every treaty and alliance, every tac-
tic and strategy, every plan and course of action to
halt the destruction of the environment.” Al Gore,
Earth in the Balance (New York: Plume, 1993), pp.
272, 274. As Patrick J. Michaels, senior fellow in
environmental studies at the Cato Institute, com-
mented, “If writing a bill to invest Social Security
funds in the stock market isn’t a ‘policy,’ a ‘pro-
14
gram,’ a ‘law’ applied to an ‘institution,’ a ‘tactic,’
and/or a ‘strategy,’ I don’t know what it is.” Patrick
J. Michaels, “Social Security or Green Socialism?”
Washington Times, March 5, 1999, p. A17.
54. See Archer and Shaw, Testimony of June 29,
1999; and Goss. 
55. See Archer and Shaw, Testimony of June 29,
1999.
56. Joseph J. Cordes and C. Eugene Steuerle, “A
Primer on Privatization,” Urban Institute,
Retirement Project, Occasional Paper no. 3,
November 1999, p. 12.
57. On other flaws in Archer-Shaw, see Olsen,
pp. 9–10. 
58. Martin Feldstein, “America’s Golden Oppor-
tunity,” The Economist, March 13, 1999, pp. 41–43. 
59. Joel Mowbray, “The Flaws in Feldstein,”
Investors’ Business Daily, April 23, 1999, p. A24. 
60. “Wanda Worker” was born in 1960 and
earns $30,364 annually. Assuming her income
continues unchanged, at age 67 she would be
entitled to Social Security benefits of $1,096 per
month, equivalent to a private joint-and-sur-
vivor annuity costing $169,136 (at average 1995
prices). If personal accounts were funded with
the 10.6 percent of wages currently devoted to
Social Security’s Old Age and Survivors pro-
gram, Wanda would invest $268.22 in her
account monthly. Over a 45-year working life-
time, an annual return of 0.67 percent would be
sufficient to fund guaranteed monthly retire-
ment benefits of $1,096. If, like many women,
Wanda purchased a single annuity rather than a
more expensive joint-and-survivor annuity, her
annuity cost would fall to only $138,035 at
retirement and her required rate of return to
less than zero (i.e., her investments could lose
money and she would still be better off than she
would be with Social Security).  Finally, even if
Wanda spent 10 years raising children (meaning
she had a working lifetime of only 35 years),
with an annual return of only 2.2 percent she
could still save enough to purchase a joint-and-
survivor annuity. 
61. In Feldstein’s plan, the shortfall is made up by
increasing the size of the initial account, funded
out of general revenue. Although Social Security
reaps a smaller percentage of the account’s bal-
ance under Feldstein’s plan than under Archer-
Shaw, the larger initial account balance reduces
the funding gap caused by Feldstein’s 75 percent
clawback.
62. Archer, “Statement on Introduction of Social
Security Guarantee Plan.” Emphasis in original.
For discussion of how to fund a full privatization
plan without raising taxes or cutting benefits, see
Peter J. Ferrara and Michael Tanner, A New Deal for
Social Security (Washington: Cato Institute, 1998),
esp. chap. 9.
63. Rolnick, p. 7.
Published by the Cato Institute, Cato Briefing Papers is a regular series evaluating government policies and
offering proposals for reform. Nothing in Cato Briefing Papers should be construed as necessarily reflecting
the views of the Cato Institute or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.
Additional copies of Cato Briefing Papers are $2.00 each ($1.00 in bulk). To order, or for a complete listing
of available studies, write the Cato Institute, 1000 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001,
call (202) 842-0200 or fax (202) 842-3490. Contact the Cato Institute for reprint permission.
